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Abstract 
This paper will explore bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania during the post-Ottoman 
period. The aim of the paper is to explore reasons for the revival and establishment of relations since 
the creation of both nation states at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the 21st century, Turkish 
foreign policy shifts in the Balkans, along with the rise of the Turkish economy and military capability 
are in line with Albanian needs politically and economically. More importantly, the Turkey’s repeated 
assurances to protect the Albanian people has been paramount for Albanians who live in the five 
surrounding states, that is Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.  
Introduction 
This paper will explore bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania since the 
creation of the Albanian state in 1912. I examine the economic, security and 
geopolitical context of Albanian/Turkish interactions since the end of the Cold War. 
While Albanian foreign policies since the creation of the Albanian state until WWII1, 
communist era 2 , and the post cold war period 3  have been scrutinised by various 
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scholars, it is much more difficult to find analyses of the post-Ottoman bilateral 
relations between Albania and Turkey. Before the recognition of the Republic of Turkey 
in 1923, there were signs of the beginning of a new era accentuating post-colonial 
relations between the two countries. 4  During and after the Cold War, political, 
economic and defence relations between Albania and Turkey were re-established and 
strengthened.5 While it will be interesting to see whether the new and fragile Albanian 
democracy needs Turkish political and economic support, there is no doubt that ‘small’ 
Albania needs Turkish defence capability in a continuously struggling Balkan region.6 
Whilst Turkey is one of Albania’s strategic partners, it is unclear how strong the 
relationship is when it comes to defence and security matters. The paper will discuss 
reasons as to why the Albanian government considers Turkey a stronger ally than other 
neighbours in the Western Balkans. The strong political relations between Turkey and 
Albania may improve further after upcoming energy and infrastructure projects such 
as Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Corridor VIII . The Corridor VIII is one of ten 
pan-European vital corridors within Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe 
established by European conferences of Prague (1991), Crete (1994) and Helsinki 
(1997). However, it remains to be seen how these developments will affect the Euro-
Atlantic vision of both countries. 
Notwithstanding the fluidity of the relationship between the two countries, I seek to 
explore some broad questions: What is the Turkish motivation for investing in this 
relationship, and what is Albania gaining from further strengthening its bilateral 
relation with Turkey compared to other regional players? Can the strength of Turkish 
support create a shift in the Albanian focus towards Turkey at a time when the 
European ‘dream’ seems far away? Geographically, Albania is situated along the Via 
Egnatia, which for centuries connected Rome with Constantinople, or what is 
considered ‘East’ and ‘West’.7 Connections between the Albanian-speaking people and 
Turks increased during the Ottoman rule of Albanian lands for five centuries. Thus, it 
will be interesting to examine how these relations developed after Albania’s 
independence in 1912.  
From rulers to supporters: The emergence of political relations 
between Turkey and Albania in the post-Ottoman era 
The first Balkan War broke out on 8 October 1912. A few weeks later, on 28 November 
1912, Ismail Qemali declared Albanian independence, which formally ended the 
Ottoman occupation of the Albanian territories. Exhausted Turkish troops gradually 
started to retreat from Albanian vilayets, marking the end of the Ottoman era in 
																																																								
the prospect of accession, Dajt, Tirana, 2004; I. Kadare, Kombi Shqipetar ne prag te mijevjecarit te trete [The 
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4 H. M. Limaj, Midis Ankarasë dhe Tiranës: 1990-2000. Nga ditari i një atasheu ushtarak [Between Ankara and 
Tirana: 1990-2000. From the diary of a military attaché], Emal, Tirana, 2012, pp. 29-31. 
5 H. M. Limaj, p. 223. 
6 The Balkans have been a historical crossroad of war since the Middle Ages, as the Romans and the Byzantines 
used the region as a battlefield. The Turkish rule, since the fifteenth century, exacerbated the existing divisions 
between the Balkan populations. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century 
caused regional conflict. Two Balkan wars, followed by WWI and WWII led to total economic devastation, and 
created further division on the Balkan Peninsula. While the Cold War created divisions between communist 
Albania and other Balkan states, currently, the European Union (EU) is reluctant to accept Western Balkan states 
as EU members due to their limited economic, political and anti-corruption reforms. On the other hand, Russia’s 
influence in the Balkans is increasing, and thus, is fuelling the Balkan nationalism.  
7 M. Bulut and M. Idriz, Turkish Albanian Macedonian Relations: Past, Present and Future, Adam-Actor, Ankara, 
2012, p. 9. 
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Albania. The retreat of the Turkish troops led to increased anxiety among Albanian 
leaders, as the founders of the Balkan League8 were ready to fill the vacuum left by the 
withdrawal of the Ottoman troops. 
Certainly, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia showed not the slightest hesitation 
or moral qualm in planning the partition of Albanian lands.9 
Faced with the Turkish withdrawal10, knowing the aims of the Balkan League and being 
without support from the Great Powers11, Albanians were left with little choice but “to 
fight for the Turks against their Balkan neighbours”.12 The Albanian struggle to protect 
its territorial integrity continued during two Balkan Wars in 1912-13, which “occurred 
because of the determination of the Balkan states to resolve their issues of national 
unity in the face of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the opposition of the 
Great Powers”. 13  Not only did the Great Powers fail to enforce 14  the 1878 Berlin 
Treaty15, in 1914 they found themselves embroiled in WWI.16  During WWI Greek, 
Serbian, Montenegrini, Italian, French, Bulgarian and Austrian troops fought all on 
Albanian soil. 17  This was a time when Turkey was dealing with its own internal 
struggles in trying to replace the Ottoman Caliphate with a modern state in the form of 
a republic. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who has been described as “the moral and 
intellectual epitome”18 of the Turkish movement, assumed a friendly position towards 
Albania even before the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.19 For example in 
1920, Atatürk sent several educated people of Albanian origin back to Albania to help 
strengthening the Albanian state.20 On 1March 1921, addressing the National Assembly 
																																																								
8 Under the auspices of Russia in the spring of 1912 Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece signed an agreement creating ‘The 
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Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia perceived the Treaty of Berlin as a barrier to their national aspirations”. See for 
instance R. Hall, pp. 3-5. 
15 Great Powers at the time, decided to solve the Balkan question in autumn 1878 a time that their foreign 
ministers met in Berlin (this meeting is known as ‘Treaty of Berlin’) with the Prussian Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck, who offered to chair as an “honest broker”. R. Hall, p. 3.  
16 R. Hall, p. 21. 
17 B. Jelavich, “The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920”, p. 297. 
18 R. Gingeras, Fall of the Sultanate: the Great War and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1922,  Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2016, p. 5. 
19 See H. Limaj, Midis Ankarasë dhe Tiranës: 1990-2000. Nga ditari i një atasheu ushtarak [Between Ankara 
and Tirana: 1990-2000. From the diary of a military attaché], pp. 29-31. 
20 Atatürk sent several educated people of Albanian origin to Albania to help the establishment of the Albanian 
state. One of them, colonel Selaudin Shkoza, a man with Prizren heritage, was appointed as the defence minister 
in the Albanian government in 1920. Shkoza’s appointment started to lay foundations for new diplomatic relations 





of Turkey, Atatürk clarified “sanctuary” links between Turks and “brother” Albanians 
stating that “we [Turks] are going to help as much as we can” and provide whatever 
this brother nation-state needs.21 He believed in a republican and modern Turkey, and 
he hoped for Albania to become a free and prosperous country.22 At the same time, 
Atatürk and other Turkish Republican leaders started to repudiate the Ottoman past 
as a backward and ‘non-western’ society. This shift accommodated Albania’s needs, 
starting a new chapter of relations between Turkey and Albania. Cultural similarities, 
commonalities in dealing with oppressors, and the desire to create an independent 
state led to the formation of new ties between Turkey and Albania after the end of 
WWI23, a time when Turkey returned to Albania, not as an oppressor, but now as one 
of main supporters of the inexperienced and poor state of Albania.  
Intermittent but cordial political relations between the Republic 
of Turkey and Albania: 1923-1990 
On 15 December 1923, just over a month after the Declaration of the Republic of Turkey 
on 29 October 1923, a ‘Memorandum of Friendship’ between the two states paved the 
way for another five years of increasing diplomatic relations. This was now a post-
colonial agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Albanian government, led 
by Ahmet Zogu. Zogu came to power in 1922, establishing an authoritarian regime that 
filled the political gap left in Albania after WWI. He was a Muslim conservator who 
was educated at Lycée de Galatasaray in Constantinople and the leader of 
“conservative landowning beys and tribal heads of bajraktars”.24 Despite the support 
of some tribe leaders, his popularity decreased and he lost his legitimacy, fleeing to 
Yugoslavia after the so-called “June revolution” in 1924.25 The reformist and liberal 
government led by Fan Noli was appointed in June 1924, but only lasted until 
December 1924, a time that Zogu returned to power, backed by Albanian tribal 
supporters and the Yugoslav military.26  He declared himself King Zog I in 1928.27 
Zogu’s decision to turn Albania into a monarchy disappointed Atatürk who, despite his 
sympathy for Albania, terminated diplomatic relations by recalling the Turkish 
ambassador Tahir Lütfi from Tirana.28 In response, Zogu closed the Albanian embassy 
in Ankara, leaving the fate of many Albanians living in Turkey in the hands of the 
Italian consulate in Ankara. 29  The conflict lasted three years, until the second 
Conference of the Balkans on 20 October 1931. Later, on 14 May 1933, the new 
Albanian ambassador, Xhevat Leskoviku, met with Atatürk, who in response sent 
Ruşen Es ̧ref as Turkish ambassador to Tirana on 15 April 1934.30 Upon his arrival in 
Albania, Es ̧ref met King Zog, who then echoed Atatürk’s previous words in describing 
Turkey as the “big brother” of Albania.31 The excellent diplomatic relations between 
Albania and Turkey were again disrupted in April 1939, by the occupation of Albania 
																																																								
21 H. Limaj, p. 29. 
22 H. Limaj, p. 33. 
23 H. Limaj, pp. 32-33. 
24 P. Morgan, Ismail Kadare: The Writer and the Dictatorship, 1957-1990 p. 12. 
25 M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo,  Hurst & Company, London,   1998,  pp. 110-111. 
26 O. Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History, Volume I: Albania and King Zog: Independence, 
Republic and Monarchy, 1908-1939,  pp. 157-158; Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo,  p. 
114. 
27 P. Morgan, Ismail Kadare: The Writer and the Dictatorship, 1957-1990 p. 13. 
28 For the republican Atatürk, the shift to an Albanian monarchy was an enormous step backward. 
29 H. Limaj, Midis Ankarasë dhe Tiranës: 1990-2000. Nga ditari i një atasheu ushtarak [Between Ankara and 
Tirana: 1990-2000. From the diary of a military attaché], p. 34. 
30 H. Limaj, p. 34. 
31 H. Limaj, p. 34. 
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by fascist Italy. However, when German occupation replaced Italian occupation in 
1942, restoring “the formal independence of Albania and, to an extent, respect[ing] 
the country’s sovereignty” the Turkish government re-opened the Turkish Consulate 
in Tirana.32 The withdrawal of Nazi Germany from Albania in the winter of 1944 and 
the arrival of communism in 194533 were momentous events, which severed diplomatic 
relations between Turkey and Albania completely. On 16 July 1945, the Turkish 
Ambassador, Muzaffer Kamil Bayur departed Albania.34  A decade after this, on 14 
December 1955, however, Turkey voted for Albania to become a full member of the 
United Nations (UN).35 Turkey’s vote helped Albania to achieve an important goal, and 
thus was welcomed by Albanian authorities. As a result, the Albanian—Turkish 
diplomatic relations started to warm up again and culminated in the official re-
establishment of diplomatic relations on 13 June 1958.36  The Turkish embassy in 
Tirana re-opened on 27 June of the following year. Following the Turkish coup the next 
year, diplomatic relations remained formally in place, but without significant 
interaction. Albania returned Turkey’s favour on 18 December 1965 by siding with 
Turkey against the recognition of Cyprus in an important vote in the UN. Despite the 
fact that their votes were ultimately unsuccessful, and Cyprus was granted recognition 
(with the General Assembly resolution 2077 being approved), 37  this vote boosted 
relations between the two countries.  
During this time, relations between Albania and Russia had also ceased (in 1961), and, 
due to the difficult relations with its neighbours, Greece and Yugoslavia, Albania came 
to value Turkey as a strategic ally.38 Although Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, 
and thus, was classified as a western country by the Albanian communist regime, 
during the Cold War, Albania and Turkey had “few noticeable direct political 
contacts”.39  As I have discussed, the Albanian/Turkish relationship has ebbed and 
flowed over the past century. However, even during the communist period there were 
no open hostilities between the two countries. The largely political discussion has 
overlooked the significant cultural exchanges between Turks and Albanians who may 
not have been aware of what was occurring at a political level. Certainly before the 
arrival of communism, personal interactions between Turks and Albanians were 
relatively free. Even during the Cold War, the two countries maintained cultural 
exchanges in the form of folk dance competitions, as well as academic, sporting, 
agricultural, tourism and commercial interactions. 40  While the average Albanian 
																																																								
32 R. Elsie, “1945 Final Report of the German Wehrmacht in Albania”, retrieved from ‘Texts and documents of 
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Germany from Albania in the winter of 1944, the PKSH came to power, persecuting the political alternative, Balli 
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the Dictatorship, 1957-1990 p. 13. 
34 Political relations between the two countries remained static for a decade, until Albanian leaders requested to 
move diplomatic relations forward. 
35 “60 vjet Shqiperi ne OKB [Albania and the United Nations: 60 Years of Partnership]”, Albanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, p. 4. 
36 R. Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, ed. 2, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth, UK, 
2010, p. 455. 
37 “Cyprus: New hope after 45 years on the Security Council agenda”; Security Council Report: Special Research 
Report, 4 September 2008, p. 10. 
38 H. Limaj, Midis Ankarasë dhe Tiranës: 1990-2000. Nga ditari i një atasheu ushtarak [Between Ankara and 
Tirana: 1990-2000. From the diary of a military attaché], p. 36. 
39 R. Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, p. 455. 
40 M. Vickers and J. Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity New York University Press, New York, 





citizen faced restricted movement, with tight controls on exit and entry into other 
countries, these groups represented a minority organised by the Albanian regime. 
While the government allowed certain groups to travel, for example, to perform at 
approved contests and competitions, all members of these groups faced similar 
conditions as the Albanian writers who were strictly scrutinised by the communist 
regime. 41  Relations between Albania and Turkey at the grass roots level (i.e. 
interactions between individuals) faced their own challenges, and it would be 
interesting to undertake a detailed study of this relatively uncharted area. However, 
this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
In 1968, Ferruh Bozbeyli, the chairman of the Turkish National Assembly, visited 
Albania in an attempt to discuss ways “to further improve Ankara’s ties with the 
communist leadership of Tirana”42, at a time when politically and economically, China 
was becoming important to Albania. Even during this period, the relations with Turkey 
were kept very cordial. By the time of the formal break with China in 1978, Albania had 
become isolated, with an economy on the verge of collapse. Once more, in difficult 
circumstances for Albania, trade with Turkey resumed. In December 1980, a Turkish 
delegation visited Tirana. The visit was returned by an Albanian delegation led by 
Nedin Hoxha, a minister and cousin of Enver Hoxha almost exactly a year later.43 In 
1988, after a historic meeting of the Albanian foreign minister Reis Malile with the 
foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Romania in Belgrade44, 
Hoxha’s successor – the Albanian Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly 
- Ramiz Alia, welcomed the Turkish foreign minister Mesut Yilmaz to Tirana.45 The 
visit was returned in 1990 by an Albanian delegation. The end of the communist regime 
in Albania also signified the end of unstable diplomatic relations between Albania and 
Turkey, to now open a new era of continuous and uninterrupted relations. 
The post-communist decade: Establishment of the bilateral 
political relations as a win-win situation 
In April 1991, Sali Berisha was elected Albanian president, after the Albanian 
Democratic Party (PD) won the first democratic elections. One of the main challenges 
for the new fragile Albanian “democracy” was a nearly collapsed economy. Turkey 
stepped in when Albania’s need was at its greatest:  
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans was significantly influenced by Turkish President 
Halil Turgut Özal who took tremendous advantage of Albania’s weak economy and its 
state of extreme poverty. 46  
																																																								
41 Peter Morgan mentions that although Albanian writers had better pay and conditions, they were kept under 
closer scrutiny by the communist regime. Even the work of the well-known Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare, was 
censured by Hoxha’s regime. Therefore it was a constant struggle for Kadare to survive one of the most tyrannic 
regimes that considered the work of writers and artists as “extremely seriously”. See for instance P. Morgan, 
Ismail Kadare: The Writer and the Dictatorship, 1957-1990, pp. 1-2, 23. 
42 P. Tase, “Albania And Turkey: Two Nations With Common Vision To Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation, 1990-
2000”: Retrieved from Foreign Policy News, 25 January 2014, available from 
http://foreignpolicynews.org/2014/01/25/albania-turkey-two-nations-common-vision-strengthen-bilateral-
cooperation-1990-2000/, last visited on16 April 2016. 
43 R. Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, p. 455. 
44 D. Binder, “Rivalry Aside, 6 Balkan Lands Meet and Agree”, The New York Times, 6 March, 1988. 
45 P. Tase, “Albania And Turkey: Two Nations With Common Vision To Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation, 1990-
2000”. 
46 P. Tase, “Albania And Turkey: Two Nations With Common Vision To Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation, 1990-
2000”. 
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There are different interpretations of these circumstances. While this implies 
opportunism, according to Hajro Limaj, the first post-communist Albanian military 
attaché in Ankara who served for the period from 1990-2000, Turkey acted in 
generosity.47  
The facts are that in 1991, through their President Özal, Turkey donated approximately 
USD14 million to Albania through Eksim Bank48 – the first country to offer a post-
communist donation of this scale to Albania. A number of visits from both Turkish and 
Albanian leaders in years to come brought about an increase in economic, political and 
defence support to Albania. Money donated to the Albanian government was followed 
by Turkish investments to restore mosques and religious buildings, ambulances and 
equipment for hospitals, motor vehicles for the Albanian police forces, along with 
scholarships given to Albanian ‘civilian and military’ students to study in Turkey.49 In 
1992, the Turkish government also granted “USD29 million in the form of food, 
technology and towards Albania’s economic revitalization efforts”.50 
Turkish authorities re-commenced their visits to now ‘democratic’ Albania on 17-21 
November 1991 with the visit of the Turkish General Doğan Güres ̧. Six months later, in 
June 1992, the Turkish Prime Minister (PM) Süleyman Demirel visited Albania and 
signed an agreement of bilateral friendship and cooperation with his counterparts.51 
Demirel was elected as the Turkish PM in 1965, at the time when Albania voted pro 
Turkey in the UN on the Cyprus issue.52  As a constant Albanian sympathiser, he 
reassured Albanian leaders in 1992 that “Turkey was committed to provide USD50 
million in humanitarian and logistical assistance to Albania”.53 
The bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania intensified after the first 
ministerial meeting held in Ankara on 24 July 1992, further evidenced by the visit of 
the Turkish President Özal on 18-21 February 1993. Özal, who addressed the Albanian 
National Assembly, agreed to sign “a fifteen year economic agreement with Albania 
that would cover a wide area of cooperation from infrastructure projects to military 
assistance and growth of the tourism industry”.54 Two months later, in April 1993, the 
Albanian President, Berisha returned the visit, followed by the Albanian Prime 
Minister Aleksander Meksi at the end of the same year. During meetings between the 
two presidents, sensitive issues were discussed. Özal tried to convince Berisha to 
recognize the new independent state of Macedonia (FYROM), as the only way to 
improve relations between the two countries, with a goal to make the Balkan region a 
more peaceful place. Berisha raised concerns regarding tensions with Albania’s 
neighbours, Greece and Serbia, and asked for total economic and defence support from 
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Turkey.55 The term “total” used by Berisha is clear: at the end of the Cold War, Albanian 
authorities aimed to fully rely on Turkey. 
Albanian authorities were also making moves to signal their closeness to their Turkish 
counterparts. For example, in December 1992, Albanian delegates decided Albania 
would become a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), without 
consulting the Albanian parliament. 56  This shift triggered a sharp debate that 
questioned whether Albania’s identity was shifting towards Islam and the East.57 At 
this time, Albania secured economic assistance in the form of donations from Turkey, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to restore old and build new mosques and Islamic schools.58 
For Turkey, this was a step in the right direction, bolstering Turkey’s support for 
Muslim Albania, and thus establishing an official presence in the Balkan region. 
The collapse of the Albanian government in 1997 (due to failed investment schemes) 
alongside the worsening situation in Kosovo, brought about another wave of exchange 
visits between Turkish and Albanian leaders. Thus, on 11 April 1998, the second 
president of Albania, Rexhep Meidani welcomed the two-day visit of the Turkish 
President Demirel. This visit was not a simple, friendly meeting between the two 
presidents. Demirel was escorted by many high ministerial figures, leaders of different 
Turkish institutions and members of the business community; assisted by a wide 
coverage from the Turkish media.59  The stated aim of this visit was again to help 
Albanians in difficult times. President Demirel stood before the Albanian parliament 
and claimed that “65 million Turks are close to the Albanian people”, anytime they 
need help.60 Demirel’s strong words reaffirmed Turkish support for Albania, while he 
called for an immediate stop of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. 61  After warning the 
international community that Turkey could not “allow the terrible tragedy of Bosnia 
[to] happen again”, in his speech to the Albanian parliament, president Demirel argued 
that it was necessary to “immediately halt the bloodshed in Kosovo; restore the 
fundamental human rights and grant full freedom to Albanians in Kosovo; start a 
dialogue between all parties immediately and ensure people who were forcefully 
chased and driven out of Kosovo return to their respective lands.”62  
For the Albanian people, the wounds of the period between 1997 and 1999 will need a 
long time to heal.63 While pyramid schemes caused political crises and a quasi civil 
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war,64 that caused around 2000 deaths65, Albania’s Kosovar brothers were facing a 
massacre, and an expulsion caused by the military machine of Slobodan Milosevic. 
Therefore, Demirel’s visit was historically very important as it signified support for the 
Albanian people during the most difficult period since the end of the communist 
regime. Turkish support was noted by the Albanian President Rexhep Meidani, who 
emphasized the importance of Albanian-Turkish relations, adding that “Turkey 
particularly in the decade of the 90s, has extended a hand of hospitality like no other 
nation to Albania”, as did the Albanian Assembly Speaker, Skender Gjinushi, who re-
affirmed that the “Albanian Assembly and all political parties, despite their program 
differences, […] all want to strengthen bilateral ties with Turkish government”. 66 
Demirel’s visit was completed with the signing of agreements such as a bilateral 
agreement on social policy and labour reforms, reviews of the migration policy, 
employment monitoring and analysis, media67 and research on the impact of social 
policies in Albanian communities. These agreements ensured that at the close of the 
twentieth century, relations between Turkey and Albania finished on a high, and 
suggested a promising start to the twenty-first century.  
At this time Turkey also played an important role in NATO missions in Kosovo in 1999. 
NATO jets not only used the proximity of Turkish bases, but Turkey had direct 
involvement: providing 18 fighter jets to conduct surveillance operations over Serbian 
airspace. On the 28-29 February 2000, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit paid an 
official visit to Albania.68 In his meeting with the Albanian PM, Ilir Meta, Ecevit denied 
the brutal treatment of Turkish minorities by Serbian forces in Kosovo and emphasized 
Turkish support for Albania.  
Continuity of the Turkish-Albanian political relations in the 
twenty-first century 
The twenty-first century opened with two major events for Albanians: The Kosovar 
parliament declaring independence from Serbia in 2008, and Albania becoming a 
NATO member in 2009. In both cases, Turkey was in the front line, recognising the 
Republic of Kosovo from day one and lobbying for Albania to become a NATO member. 
Turkish support for Albania is not welcomed by Albania’s neighbours Serbia and 
Greece. Greek foreign policy with regards to Kosovo is in line with Serbian authorities 
beliefs, which consider Kosovo part of Serbia cut off by NATO in 1999. The situation is 
different when it comes to the NATO issue. Greece is a NATO member, and thus, needs 
to share values with Albania, whereas Serbia counts on Russia’s political and military 
support. Therefore, it seems that what unites both Serbia and Greece against Albania 
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is the ghost of the ‘Greater Albania’.69 As a result, for Albanian authorities, Turkey’s 
foreign policy is more closely aligned with their needs. Visits from politicians and 
higher officials from both governments intensified the tradition of maintaining 
periodic meetings. The Albanian President, Alfred Moisiu, visited Turkey in May 2003, 
and a week later, Turkish PM Erdoğan paid a courtesy visit to Tirana. This was the 
second time Erdoğan visited Tirana as a PM, and he was to return again in 2013 and 
2015 as President. The next Albanian President, Bamir Topi, and the Albanian PM Sali 
Berisha visited Turkey in April 2012. In October of the same year, the Albanian foreign 
minister, Edmond Panariti visited Turkey and held talks with the then Turkish foreign 
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu, visited Albania on 4-
5 October 2013. During his visit, Davutoğlu aimed to establish high-level strategic 
cooperation mechanisms, and create sustainable political, economic and trade 
relations between the two countries. Since his election as Prime Minister, on 23 June 
2013, Edi Rama highlighted the need for Albania’s “strategic relations with Turkey”, 
which were to be given an immediate and “special priority”.70 The Albanian Defence 
Minister, Mimi Kodheli and the foreign minister Ditmir Bushati visited Turkey on 18-
19 April 2014. While Kodheli signed a secret treaty71 with her Turkish counterpart, 
Bushati’s first visit as the Albanian foreign minister to Turkey aimed to further extend 
bilateral cooperation, which is enjoying a new momentum after the official visit of 
Davutoğlu to Albania in 2013. According to Davutoğlu, Albania and Turkey will 
endeavour to work together in order to achieve common goals as the ‘High Level 
Cooperation Council’ between Turkey and Albania is established.72  
Albania and Turkey have common goals indeed. Under the NATO flag, they worked 
closely in Peace Keeping operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other hot 
spots in the world, participated in the Southeast European Cooperation Process 
(SEECP), and are both members of the OIC. During the post-Cold War period, 
intermittent but continuous visits between Albanian and Turkish leaders have boosted 
the bilateral relationship between the two countries. For Turkey, the ‘little sister’ – 
Albania is deserving of assistance, and for Albania, economic and security matters are 
crucial. More importantly, the Albanian position in the region will be stronger through 
the support of the undisputable ‘big brother’ – USA, while Turkey can be a closer 
regional partner for Albania. 
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However, the motivations for Albanian-Turkish political relations are still contested. 
One might easily raise some questions: Has Turkey’s motivation been solely 
humanitarian with no hidden agenda? Is Albania being forced to rely on Turkey in 
tough times? What are the advantages of the Turkish “soft power” intervention?  
According to the Albanian foreign affairs ministry Albania has signed 74 bilateral 
agreements with Turkey between 1992 and 2013; more than with any other country, 
except Italy and Germany.73 It is of note that 29 of these agreements (or 39 per cent) 
concern military and defence matters. The majority of these agreements – 71 – were 
signed in the twenty-first century, indicating a sharp increase in defence and military 
agreements, but also an intensification of Turkish diplomatic relations with Albania. 
Turkey’s twenty-first century ‘zero problems with neighbours’ 
foreign policy 
Despite its claims of being a ‘secular’ and ‘democratic’ state, Turkey has been described 
as a “non-Western country” that is only beginning to attempt “to organise its society 
on Western lines”.74  Taspinar writes, “Turkey is deeply polarized over its Muslim, 
secular, and national identities”.75  Turkish society has been divided into two main 
political factions for a long time: those who are sympathetic to secular republicans 
known as “Kemalists”, and others who side with the “Islamic neo-Ottomanists”.76 
However, with regards to Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, Turkey’s political elite 
has always paid special attention to Albania. Historically, Albanian leaders have 
welcomed this, as they perceive Turkey to be a political, economic, and security 
guarantor. In addition, there is a significant population of Turks with Albanian 
heritage living in Turkey. The former Albanian Ambassador in Turkey, Genci Muçaj 
estimates that five million Turkish citizens of Albanian descent have significant links 
to their cultural heritage.77  Although they are not a big source of remittances for 
Albania, these people create a cultural and economic bridge between the two countries, 
and help to achieve what Muçaj describes as three Albanian diplomatic priorities in 
Turkey, namely “bilateral relations, economic and cultural diplomacy”.78 
Ömer Taspinar claims that Turkey’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century has a 
focus on the Middle East, while being trapped between ‘secular Kemalists’ and ‘Islamic 
neo-Ottomanists’.79 Hence, according to Taspinar, Ankara will be careful to “balance 
its neo-Ottoman and Kemalist instincts”.80 Unlike Taspinar, Žarko Petrović and Dušan 
Reljić believe that Turkey is shifting its foreign policy focus to the Western Balkans 
instead as “relations between Turkey and the Western Balkans have never been more 
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intensive since the foundation of the Turkish republic”.81 Davutoğlu’s speech on 16 
October 2009 at the “Ottoman legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities” conference in 
Sarajevo ” is described as a shift in Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans.82 By 2009, 
Turkish political initiatives in the Western Balkans went far beyond a “bandwagon” 
approach with the US policies in the Balkans.83 For Petrović and Reljić, Turkey “has 
leverage and increasingly capacities in the Western Balkans” which must be accepted 
and recognized by the EU.84 However, according to these authors, Turkey – a country 
with a “partly Islamic identity”, is “arguably growing stronger”. 85 For others such as 
Edward Erickson, there is no doubt that Turkey is working to become the main power 
of the region, and it is merely a question of when it will happen.86  
Turkey uses its influence in the Balkans as an example of its geopolitical importance 
and Ankara wants to demonstrate that a permanent peace in the Balkans is unattainable 
without Turkey’s help87  
In his speech at the end of the Turkish elections in July 2011, Erdoğan claimed that 
AKP’s victory aimed to serve not only the Turkish people, but that “The Middle East, 
the Caucasus, and the Balkans have won as much as Turkey”.88 A year before, Turkey’s 
former foreign minister Davutoğlu revealed the country’s twenty-first century foreign 
policy. Its slogan “zero problems with neighbours” encapsulated the policy, known as 
the “Davutoğlu doctrine”.89 In this foreign policy Davutoğlu states that:  
Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU 
membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. Second, 
it will continue to strive for regional integration, in the form of security and economic 
cooperation. Third, it will seek to play an influential role in regional conflict resolution. 
Fourth, it will vigorously participate in all global arenas. Fifth, it will play a determining 
role in international organizations and become one of the top 10 largest economies in 
the world.90 
This quote is strong evidence of Turkey’s desire to step forward onto the global stage. 
Davutoğlu’s tone and the strength of his language is an indication that he wants Turkey 
to become a ‘key’ EU member, ‘play an influential role in regional conflict resolution’ 
and ‘vigorously participate’ in global arenas. While it is not clear whether Turkey’s 
‘influential’ role is reliant on Turkey becoming an EU member, the second and third 
goals of Turkish foreign policy are a direct involvement with regards to security, 
economic cooperation and conflict resolution in the region. However, “Turkey’s 
region” needs to be clearly identified. Is it the old Ottoman Empire territory in the 
Middle East, Asia and the Balkans, or simply a geographical area that comprises 
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modern nation-states that surround the Republic of Turkey? Nevertheless, Turkey’s 
role in ‘region integration’ with regards to ‘security and economic cooperation’ is 
exactly what Albania wants Turkey to do: be Albania’s economic and military guarantor 
in the region. According to Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s actions are motivated by a great sense 
of responsibility, entrusted to it by its rich historical and geographic heritage, and by a 
profound consciousness of the importance of global stability and peace”.91 While the 
historical links between Albania and Turkey do exist, one can question their 
‘geographic heritage’. 
It has been proposed, and seems historically accurate that in 1378, the Ottoman Turks 
were invited to enter what constitutes today’s Albania by the feudal lord of Durrës, 
Karlo Topia, in order to help him in his conflict with the Balsha family.92 The Ottomans 
not only crushed the Balshas at the battle of Savra (near Lushnjë) on 18 September 
1385, but also conquered other surrounding Albanian principates, making their feudal 
lords vassals of The Sublime Porte93. From this first involvement in the region, the 
Ottomans conquered and ruled the Albanian speaking lands and the entire Balkan 
Peninsula for centuries. Although the situation in the twenty-first century is different, 
the re-emergence of Turkish interest in Albania is again challenging the Balkans. While 
the aim of both Turkish and Albanian governments is closer relations, it is unclear 
whether the Albanian people support this. There have been indications that some 
Albanian citizens do not desire increased Turkish presence in Albania. For example, 
Albanians vandalised Hasan Pasha’s memorial at the city of Shkodër on 16 July 201694 
and removed the Turkish flag, after Turkish commentator Talha Uğurluel called 
Skanderbeg a “bandit” who came down from the mountains attacking women and 
children, in the same way that terrorist Kurds attack Turkey today.95 This was followed 
by the removal of all Turkish flags placed at Prishtinë streets during Independence Day 
celebrations of Kosovo on 17 February 2017.96 It is unclear whether these are isolated 
acts of a small number of people, or part of a growing popular sentiment. 
In the last few decades, Turkish foreign policy has shown variations and has been what 
Cornell describes as a “less predictable force than it used to be and one whose policies 
will occasionally clash with those of the West”.97  In reality, Turkey and the West 
“cooperate when their interests align rather than as a result of shared values”.98 The 
absence of common values between the West and Turkey makes Turkish foreign policy 
unpredictable and unique. 
The post-Cold War era has been also a period of reformation in the Turkish armed 
forces. This brought about a modern and capable Turkish army, operating within 
NATO since 1990 in missions in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo and 
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Afghanistan. 99  Erickson believes that factors such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic 
fundamentalism’ are both ‘potential triggers’ for the rise of Turkish power. 100 The 
latest agreement between Putin and Erdoğan to deliver Russian gas through Turkish 
pipelines to southern Europe101 and to join forces in the war against terrorism can be 
seen as further evidence of Cornell’s thesis that Turkish foreign policy is becoming 
increasingly unpredictable. It has also created instability in the Balkan region. While 
Putin is getting closer to Erdoğan, the anxiety of Kosovar Albanians is increasing, as 
they see the US and Turkey as their protectors against Serbian plans to regain Kosovo. 
There is also great fear among Albanian Kosovars regarding the relationship between 
the new American President, Donald Trump and Putin. They believe that Putin will 
return Kosovo to Serbia.102  
The rise of the Turkish-Albanian post-Cold War economic 
relations  
The economic situation in Turkey improved from the mid-1980s as a result of the 
introduction of acceleration policies by Prime Minister, then President, Turgut Özal. 
As a result, agricultural and industrial production rose by 38 to 41 per cent respectively 
between 1980 and 1998.103 By 2001, however, the Turkish economy had gone into 
recession104. Nevertheless, according to Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s 
economic future was brilliant and his government’s ambitious plan was to become “one 
of the top 10 largest economies in the world” 105  by 2023. Although the Turkish 
economy has enjoyed growth over the past decades, in 2016, it showed signs of 
declining ‘from 17th to 19th place in the rankings of the biggest economies’ in the 
world.106 In the first month of 2016, Turkish exports to Western partners, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy and the USA, declined by 14.4 per cent, whereas exports to Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt rose by 30.5 and 15.1 per cent respectively. 107  The Turkish 
government is working hard to finalise free trade agreements with Iran, and improve 
its relations with Israel, which will bolster Turkey’s ambition to become a regional 
leader. Shifts by the Turkish government from the West to its 'comfort zone' – the 
Middle East are not unknown; rather they show fluctuations in Turkey’s foreign policy 
and its international reputation, which according to the former Canadian defence 
attaché to Turkey, Chris Kilford, is ‘in free-fall’.108 In the context of Turkey’s ambitious 
plans for economic growth as outlined earlier it is possible that the strengthening of 
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economic ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt will cause Turkey to align itself more with 
the Middle East than the West.  
Regardless of Turkish foreign policy fluctuations, Turkey is a much bigger and richer 
country than Albania and, therefore, an important strategic partner for Albania. 
Turkey’s population of approximately 80 million is 27 times bigger than the number of 
Albanians who still live in Albania; but most importantly, the Turkish Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is approaching 800 billion US dollars, which is nearly 57 times bigger 
that the Albanian GDP. These figures are a clear indication that Turkey has 
significantly more leverage in the bilateral relations between the two countries. 
Albania is central to the new Turkish engagement policy in the Balkans. According to 
Turkey’s commercial attaché for Albania, Muharrem Can, in 2013, Turkish businesses 
invested “1.5 billion [US] dollars, or about 10.5% of the Albanian GDP”, whereas 
Albania’s Turkish Ambassador Hidayet Bayraktar stated recently that the Turkish 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in Albania increased to 2 billion Euros.109 The Turkish 
foreign ministry website states that “Turkey is the second major trade partner of 
Albania” with a value of investments “over 1 billion Euros”.110 Other literature points 
out that in 2014, “Turkish investments in Albania have increased by US$ 2 billion and 
the bilateral trade volume has reached more than US$1 billion, from US$400 million, 
only five years ago”.111 The economic connections between two countries are rapidly 
strengthening. 
The Turkish government is facilitating economic and cultural ties with Albania through 
its Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural 
Center in Albania. Following requests from the Albanian government, TIKA is 
investing to restore “mosques, bazars and historical houses” in Albania.112 At the end 
of July 2012, Turkey’s contribution to the Albanian economy passed USD 120 
million.113 As has been described, a significant proportion of that contribution has been 
dedicated to cultural restoration. 
Leading Turkish companies have invested and operate in crucial sectors of the 
Albanian economy.114 Large Turkish companies such as ENKA, Gintaş, Armada, Metal 
Yapı, Aldemir, and Servomatik are involved in construction and the building industry 
in Albania. Others such as Çalık Holding, Türk Telekom, Makro-Tel and Hes Kablo are 
involved in telecommunications. The only Albanian national telephone company, 
Albtelecom, along with Eagle Mobile, are owned by BKT, a Turkish company. Similarly, 
the Turkish Çalık Group owns Albania’s second biggest bank – Banka Kombëtare 
Tregtare [The National-Commercial Bank].115 Şekerbank-BKT is present in banking 
and telecommunications. Kürüm has invested in the iron and steel industry, managing 
a steel factory, the only functional part of the previous backbone of the Albanian 
mineral industry – the Elbasan metallurgic factory. 
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Turkish investments are also very present in other sectors of the Albanian economy 
such as health with Universal Hospital Group; mining with Ber-Oner and Dedeman; 
manufacturing and consumer goods retail with Yilmaz Cable, Merinos, Everest, Pino 
and RM Kocak. Education is another sector influenced by Turkish organisations: 
Turkish Gülistan and Istanbul Foundations have invested heavily in all stages of 
education from primary schools to tertiary education. Turkish companies manage four 
medium hydropower plants, the largest port of Albania – Durrës goods terminal, and 
important parts of the Albanian infrastructure, such as the construction of the North-
South freeway Rruga e Kombit, which connects Albania with Kosovo. To support these 
companies, 474 Turkish citizens reside in Albania (more than Italian and Greek 
citizens), operating under work permits.116  
While the Albanian media has described Turkish economic involvement in Albania as 
“the second invasion” 117  of Albania, Muharrem Can thinks that the Turkish 
government does not seek to economically dominate the region. According to Can, the 
increase in import-export with Albania is a result of the Turkish economy growing 
rapidly in the region.118 Can’s diplomatic statement does not negate the increase of 
Turkish soft power over Albania. In reality, the Turkish Ambassador, Bayraktar, is “not 
satisfied with these [economic] figures, when comparing the excellent level of our 
[Turkish and Albanian] political relations”.119 Strengthening bilateral economic ties in 
the future will help the weak Albanian economy, whilst bringing Turkey closer to the 
western Balkans.  
Turkey: a NATO teammate and Albania’s guarantor 
The defence sector has been another area of strong cooperation between Turkey and 
Albania. Under the NATO mandate, Albania had a unit of soldiers operating in 
Afghanistan, “serving within the Turkish command deployed in Kabul”.120 Although 
Albania became a NATO member in 2009, since the end of the Cold War, Albania has 
depended heavily on Turkish “assistance in training and supply of cutting edge defence 
technology, as well as the reconstruction of Albania’s military bases and their 
maintenance”.121 According to Limaj, a new era of military partnership between the 
two countries started on 19 November 1992, with the signing of a partnership 
agreement to educate and train the Albanian forces.122 For the then Turkish Defence 
Minister, Nevzat Ayaz, the “agreement focused on broadening bilateral cooperation in 
the areas of military education and technology.”123 As part of this agreement, Turkish 
military personnel of “infantry, land, naval and Air Force bases have trained Albanian 
Armed Forces”, providing “technological equipment” and helping to “rebuild its 
military infrastructure”. 124  There have been an increasing number of high-level 
government visits between Albania and Turkey since then. For example, between 19 
January and 20 November 1992, the Albanian Army General Kristaq Karoli, Defence 
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Minister Safet Zhulali and General Ilia Vasho visited Turkey. The Turkish General 
Doğan Güreş and the Defence minister Nevzat Ayaz returned their visit in the same 
year.  
During his visit to Albania, the Turkish defence minister, Ayaz stated that it is Turkey’s 
‘obligation’ to help its ‘sister’, Albania. The Albanian defence minister Safet Zhulali 
visited Turkish military basis and factories; sharing sensitive information at a time no 
other defence minister from a country that was not a NATO member had done 
before.125 A month later, after the Albanian delegation returned from Turkey on 28 
August 1992, “the Turkish Gearing Class destroyer, TCG Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak,” 
visited the Albanian port of Durrës.126 Both of these episodes can be interpreted as an 
indication of the high level of trust between the two countries, but they also 
demonstrate the need for both Albania and Turkey to show Turkey’s power. The 
collaboration between Albania and Turkey in economic and defence matters seems not 
only to bolster political relations between the two countries, but also to reassure the 
Albanian government. More recent evidence of the strong ties between the two 
countries includes high Albanian military officials proudly welcoming the visit of the 
Turkish submarine “TCG Sakarya” to Durrës on 10 November 2014.127  
According to ‘official statistics’, Turkey has spent more than any other country in 
training all levels of the Albanian military forces thus far.128 Turkey has equipped the 
Albanian Guard of the Republic, trained the Albanian special troops, reconstructed the 
Albanian military base at Pashaliman, the Marine Academy of Vlorë and the Air force 
Academy of Kuçovë; it has also modernised the munitions factories at Poliçan and 
Gramsh. Between 1992 and 2000, more than 1000 Albanian students and military 
officials were educated at the Turkish academies, and Turkish military officials trained 
3491 Albanian troops in Albania.129 In the last two decades, “many Albanian military 
students [graduated or are] studying in the Turkish War Academies”, and “from 1998 
onwards, over 100 Albanian students graduated from the National Police Academy”.130 
It has been argued that as a result of this involvement, Turkey has an intimate and 
detailed knowledge of Albanian security matters.  
While these indicators show Turkey as a trustworthy strategic partner for the Albanian 
government, when one takes into account the history of relations between the two 
countries, it is not so clear as to why Albania trusts Turkey on security matters. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Turkey was considered by some Albanian leaders 
as the only hope to protect Albania from being partitioned by its neighbours. On the 
other hand, as Peter Sugar mentions, “the Ottoman political legacy must be considered 
the greatest problem faced by peoples who, once again, had become masters of their 
own destiny”. 131  At present, Albanian policy makers need the military muscle of 
Turkey. According to Limaj, the latest example was the decision of Turkey to protect 
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the territorial integrity of Albania during the political turmoil in 1997132. During these 
revolts the state lost control of some parts of Albania, and according to Limaj, there 
were international plans to divide Albania. 133  Following the advice by the Turkish 
General Karadaj, on 29 March 1997, the Turkish PM Tansu Çiller stated: 
Turkey will protect the territorial integrity of Albania and cannot stay passive in the face 
of events that threaten to divide Albania.134 
For Bayraktar, “Turkey has a lot to contribute to the future of the Balkans together with 
the EU”, however, a small group of authors and historians “are evaluating and 
distorting the common history” and “triggering negative feelings among the 
peoples”.135 While this shows that Turkish authorities wish Turkey to be perceived as a 
saviour, and not an oppressor, ‘the small group of authors and historians’ as described 
by Bayraktar has a considerable influence. In reality Bayraktar’s simplistic version 
obscures a bigger challenge as shown by recent requests by Turkish authorities that the 
Albanian and Kosovar governments alter Albanian schoolbooks, and portray Ottomans 
as “friendly administrators”136, or better yet, ‘protectors’ who brought about political 
stability to the Albanian speaking lands. This is a complex issue, which continues to 
cause trouble in the relations between Turkey and Albania. Furthermore, the anti-
Ottoman camp, which was ‘funded’ by the Albanian rilindja writers, is now led by the 
prominent Albanian writer – Ismail Kadare, who has written extensively about his 
concern that Albania is growing too close to Turkey again.137 
Geopolitics and energy security drivers in the Albanian-Turkish 
relations 
In the twenty-first century, Albania is hoping to strengthen its geopolitical position in 
the region with two main projects: The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Pan-
European Corridor VIII. Turkey also has a direct interest and involvement in both 
projects. 
In February 2013, after ten years of negotiation and assessments138, TAP was selected 
as the best project to bring Caspian natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field to Italy 
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and largely, Europe. The pipeline will be connected to the Turkish Trans Anatolian 
Pipeline (TANAP) at the Greek-Turkish border. TANAP will then connect to the South 
Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPX) that runs across Georgia and Azerbaijan. TAP 
will be 870 km long and will cross Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea to deliver the 
gas to Santa Foca (Lecce, Italy).  
The aim of TAP is to diversify Europe’s energy sources, which at the moment are 
heavily dependent on Russia. TAP’s significance was amplified after Russia annexed 
Crimea on 18 March 2014. After this event, the conflict of some EU countries and 
Russia deepened, and consequently, American and European sanctions were placed on 
Russia. All countries involved in this project: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Italy, Turkey, Greece 
and Albania hope to advance their relations with the EU, as TAP will place them in a 
favourable position compared to other regional neighbours. It remains to be seen 
whether bilateral relations between the not-yet EU members – Turkey and Albania, 
may become fruitful as a result of energy and security matters.  
Nevertheless, TAP offers an economic win-win situation for all countries the gas 
pipeline runs through. Turkey, Greece and Albania – all NATO members, are countries 
that will generate income for their economies. For Albania, TAP is currently the biggest 
international investment139, placing Albania, Turkey and Greece at the centre of energy 
security policies within the EU. TAP may also restore new trilateral relations between 
Turkey, Greece and Albania after centuries of extremely troubled relations. 140 
Nevertheless, the latest shifts of Turkey’s foreign policy designed to develop a closer 
relationship with Moscow141, allow Russia to deliver its gas to Turkey through the 
‘Turkish Stream’ pipeline situated only 10 km from TAP.142 
The new landscape in South Eastern Europe: Pan-European 
Corridor VIII 
In looking at the European energy and infrastructure distribution map, it is obvious 
that the western Balkans area has been left behind. Although three Pan-European 
conferences in Prague (1991), Crete (1994) and Helsinki (1997) established ten pan-
European corridors within Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe, for a long time, 
due to economic restraint and lack of local resources, one of the greatest projects – the 
PAN European Corridor VIII, has not been considered as one of “the Top 30” priority 
projects by European Union. 143  However, the latest developments require a 
reassessment of the Corridor VIII, which include energy and infrastructure axis in the 
Western Balkans and South East Europe. There are several reasons for this: the 
completion of the Napoli-Bari high capacity railway, which will connect the port of Bari 
to Corridor I (Palermo-Berlin); the need to connect with Corridor X and VI, which will 
facilitate a better and fast connection with new prospective EU countries such as 
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Turkey and Serbia; a better connection with Bulgaria – an EU country that can act as 
‘a strategic node’ in the new landscape of the South East Europe. More importantly, 
Corridor VIII will “connect the countries of the European Union with the Caspian 
basin”.144 
The Corridor VIII axis will have “a total length of 1270 km in rail tracks and 960 km of 
roads”, but also “consists [of] sea and river ports, airports, multimodal ports, roads 
and railways”.145 In Albania this Corridor is known as Via Egnatia, and has existed 
since the second century BC. WWI ended its use. However, Via Egnatia has remained 
a cultural and archaeological site of what was once considered as “the biggest nexus 
between East and West”.146 The Romans linked Via Apia (Italy) with Via Egnatia, 
which facilitated the flow of goods and people from Rome to Constantinople and thus, 
between the Roman and Byzantine Empires. Via Egnatia was not merely a simple 
transport facility: for both East and West, it “meant connectivity, trade, travel, purpose, 
prosperity”. 147  The historical importance of Via Egnatia is enormous, and its 
reconstruction will bring Turkey physically closer to the Balkans; a connection that 
currently exists through historical ties and the Ottoman legacy.148  
The Pan-European Corridor VIII in Albania is certainly a revival of Via Egnatia, which 
connected Durrës with Tirana and Elbasan and ran along the Shkumbin River to 
connect Bitola, Skopje, Kumanovo, Sofia, Dimitrovgrad, Burgas; ending at the Black 
Sea at the port of Varna. For Albania, this Corridor is crucial as it not only connects the 
East with the West, but it also acts as a catalyst for “the relationship between Turkey, 
Macedonia and Albania”.149 Although the Corridor VIII still remains imaginary due to 
obstacles created by “the lack of a railway connection between Bulgaria and 
Macedonia”, Bulgaria is joining forces with Italy to make the Corridor VIII an “EU 
priority”.150 
Corridor VIII and TAP will change the geopolitical landscape of the Western Balkans 
and South Eastern Europe. As a result, both projects, TAP and the Corridor VIII, may 
further prioritise relations with Albania in the eyes of Istanbul. As a result of interests 
and the geographical position of Turkey, these projects may generate a new dimension 
of Turkey’s relations with Muslim populations in the Western Balkans. It is not hard 
to predict that Albania is vulnerable to Turkey’s foreign policy shifts. Therefore, both 
projects, TAP and Corridor VIII, are likely to be triggers for Turkey and Albania to 
strengthen their bilateral relations, as they may need each other. The Ottoman 
narrative may be still present, however, in a globalised world, economic and political 
interests might be able to supersede this narrative.  
Conclusion 
This paper analysed increasing bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania with 
regards to economy, foreign policy, energy and security matters since the creation of 
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both nation-states. Until the end of the Cold War, diplomatic relations between Turkey 
and Albania were intermittent, but friendly, and did not affect the excellent relations 
between the two countries. A poor Albania at the end of the Cold War provided a 
“golden” opportunity for Turkey to get closer. Albania on the other hand, needs 
Turkey’s economic and military power in the region. In the twenty-first century, 
political relations between Albania and Turkey have reached a new importance.  
Although Turkey is Albania’s strategic partner, trade between the two countries has 
not yet reached its full potential. Things are different when it comes to defence and 
security matters. The Albanian government favours Turkey compared to other 
neighbours in the Western Balkans. The excellent political relations between the two 
countries will improve even further after the energy and infrastructure projects such 
as TAP and the Corridor VIII have been implemented. It remains to be seen how these 
developments will affect the Euro-Atlantic vision of both countries. 
Turkey has indeed helped the weaker Albania during those times that Albania 
desperately needed Turkish support. While the Turkish economic, political and 
military support is done in a ‘soft power’ fashion in order to accommodate Albanian 
needs, Turkey stepped forward in 1999 participating in NATO’s war against Milosevic. 
The question to be asked is whether the intensity of Turkish support will create 
conditions for a future Albanian shift towards Turkey, at a time when Europe’s internal 
unity is challenged by Brexit, Russia’s occupation of the Ukraine, refugees from Syria 
and Iraq, whilst the EU is anxiously awaiting agreements between the two powerful 
presidents, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. The new dynamics of interactions 
between the two powerful presidents can shift the political and military balance of 
power and territorial contests in the Balkans. Kosovo’s fate may depend on new 
agreements reached by Putin and Trump, while at present, Serbia is getting new 
armaments from Russia151, whereas Serbian media is claiming that Kosovo is receiving 
armaments and training from Turkey.152 The day of a permanent peace in the Balkans 
seems to have not yet arrived. Until then, there is no doubt that relations between 
Albania and Turkey will only strengthen. 
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